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Abstract 
On the face of it, self-censorship is profoundly subversive of democracy, 
particularly in its talk-centric forms, and undermines the culture of openness 
and publicity on which it relies. This paper has two purposes. The first is to 
develop a conception of self-censorship that allows us to capture what is 
distinctive about the concept from a political perspective and which allows us 
to understand the democratic anxiety about selfcensorship: if it is not obvious 
that biting our tongues is always wrong, we need a fuller account of the moral 
sensibility that finds it so troubling and this is elaborated here. The second is 
to develop an argument to the effect that this sensibility should not have the 
last, or only, word, but instead that self-censorship should be viewed as an 
‘ordinary vice’ of democratic societies. The grounds for tolerating it rest on the 
democratic values that critics believe it threatens. 
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I. Introduction 
On the face of it, self-censorship is profoundly subversive of democracy. In 
current political discourse, self-censorship is normally a source of anxiety, and 
held up as a symptom of a climate of fear, of the tyranny of the majority, 
stifling conformism, groupthink, McCarthyism, political correctness, or some 
other malign genie of democratic politics (Robin 2004). When self-censorship 
is invoked, it is almost always to be condemned, along with the cowardice and 
dishonesty of the self-censor, as part of an explanation of why some 
challenging opinion or inconvenient truth is not more widely discussed.  
So, for example, when the historian Tony Judt (cited in Pilkington 2007) 
described the “virtual silence” of the news media in the United States on the 
issues raised by Steven Walt’s and John Mearsheimer’s (2006) article on the 
“Israel lobby” he reached for the language of self-censorship: “[w]e know from 
De Tocqueville this country is driven by conformity. The law can’t make 
people speak out – it can only prevent people from stopping free speech. 
What’s happened is not censorship, but self-censorship”. As George Orwell 
acidly put it, “circus dogs jump when the trainer cracks his whip but the really 
well-trained dog is the one that turns his somersault when there is no whip”.2 
The uproar generated by the notorious cartoons first published by the Danish 
newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 2006 sparked subsequent widespread 
fulminations over press self-censorship. It will be recalled that these cartoons 
depicted Muhammad in bomb-shaped headgear, wielding a cutlass, and 
saying that paradise was running short of virgins for suicide-bombers. In their 
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coverage of the controversy stirred up by these cartoons many newspapers 
decided that it would be irresponsible to reproduce them, and in due course 
Yale University Press opted not to publish a book containing the pictures. To 
free-speech campaigners, “all this was seen as further evidence of self-
censorship amid increasing fears of upsetting sensibilities of some Muslims” 
(The Economist 2009; and see Laegaard 2007). When the “Charia Hebdo” 
cartoons published by the provocative French periodical Charlie Hebdo, the 
French journalist Nicolas Demorand (2012) warned that cartoonists shouldn’t 
be confused with foreign office diplomats: “les exhorter à prendre en compte 
le contexte géopolitique comme s’ils étaient porte-parole du Quai d’Orsay, 
c’est mettre le doigt dans un engrenage dont le premier cran est l’autocensure 
et le dernier la capitulation.” The murder of the magazine’s staff in 2015 
unleashed a torrent of understandable calls to resist the temptation to self-
censor, from a spectrum of sources, some vocally incensed by a now 
notorious injunction on the part of the Financial Times for “common sense” 
(Barber 2015). 
From this perspective, self-censorship undermines an important and 
vulnerable condition of democratic societies: even in a democracy with well-
developed liberal protections from political domination, including freedoms of 
speech, “a central precondition for avoiding such domination is the existence 
of the public sphere, a space for the exercise of shared communicative 
freedoms” (Bohman 2010: 434). Self-censorship seems to pollute this space, 
constraining citizens’ ability to speak to each other, to speak truth to power 
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and freely to express themselves. What gives rise to it are unacceptable and 
degrading relationships of power or influence.  
However, precisely what it is that is being condemned by the public 
rhetoric against self-censorship is not obvious. Free speech includes the 
option not to speak, if one wishes, and if the censorship really is censorship 
by and for oneself, more needs to be said about why this constitutes a 
problem. Most social and political discourse does not enjoy the license of 
automatic writing or the psychoanalyst’s couch, and to lack the capacity to 
monitor and restrain the expression of beliefs and expressive attitudes is 
unfortunate. And we do not always condemn the exercise of this capacity: in 
social and political life, it is sensible to accommodate others, as a matter of 
prudence or respect. We bite our tongues, we do not say what we really mean 
or what we would say among friends; as the metaphor or analogy has it, we 
censor ourselves. The discursive turn in democratic theory emphasizes not 
only the importance of self-expression but also the value of mutual respect 
and mutual accommodation, which may require curtailing the expression of 
opinions.  
This article sets out to achieve three goals. The first is to develop a 
conception of self-censorship that captures what is distinctive about the 
concept from a political point of view. Recent conceptual and taxonomic 
treatments of the topic by political philosophers have filled an important gap 
while failing to identify this, I suggest, notably a significant contribution by 
Philip Cook and Conrad Heilman (2013). The political conception of self-
censorship, I argue, is constituted not only by non-performance of a speech 
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act but by non-performance underpinned by a certain kind of explanation, in 
terms of a problematic power or influence relationship. This account allows us 
to distinguish political self-censorship from other forms of expressive self-
restraint, including prudential silence, ethical tact, and the self-restraint held to 
be inherent in a deliberative form of politics, which in many cases are not 
properly regarded as self-censorship at all: how we view these boundaries, I 
suggest, is significant for our sense of the importance of this concept (section 
II). If it is not obvious that biting our tongues is always wrong we need a fuller 
account of the moral sensibility that finds it so troubling and the grounds on 
which it does so. Second, I offer an account of what underpins this sensibility: 
I argue that democratic hostility to self-censorship responds both to the 
sources of self-censorship but also to the destructive systemic effects that it 
identifies, particularly on three key values for democracy: for this perspective, 
self-censorship corrodes individual autonomy, the quality of democratic 
debate, and the accountability of participants in democratic politics (section 
III). Third, I try to explain why self-censorship, in the political sense identified 
here, is a more ambivalent phenomenon than critics of its sources and effects 
allow. It is sometimes tolerable, as an aspect of respecting free speech and 
the agency of speakers, and as an acceptable protection against the harms of 
free speech: untrammeled speech can itself have anti-democratic effects, 
particularly in damaging the participatory standing of some citizens, and self-
censorship can play a role in mitigating these (section IV). How instances of 
self-censorship in fact do function so as to undermine or support democratic 
conditions is an important question that depends on a range of empirical 
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issues that fall outside the scope of this article. My aim here is only to provide 
a more satisfactory mapping of its significance for political theory and of how it 
could function, and to unblock some assumptions about how it must work. 
 
II. Political Self-Censorship 
The term “self-censorship” is loose, baggy and ill-defined enough to be 
deployed in a wide variety of ways, encompassing a range of expressive or 
discursive self-restraint on the part of agents. My friend censors himself when 
we discuss my singing ability. A doctor censors herself when she maps out 
prognoses to a patient’s family. A daughter censors herself when she 
discusses last night’s party with her parents. A newspaper censors itself when 
it does not publish the name of an informant. However ethically interesting 
these cases are, the argument of this section is that when critics identify self-
censorship in a political context, as in the instances in section I, they use the 
concept in a distinctive way, not only picking out an instance of expressive 
self-control or self-restraint but ascribing to it certain characteristic and 
problematic properties. To understand the concept of self-censorship in this 
way identifies it not with mere non-performance of a speech act but with non-
performance underpinned by a critical explanation. A claim that X is an 
instance of self-censorship is a claim that: A, the agent responsible for X, 
withheld some speech act that A otherwise could have been expected to 
express; that this withholding is explained by a power relationship; and that A 
is to be viewed as in some sense responsible for the withholding. Withholding 
speech acts that one would otherwise (in some sense) express does not in 
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itself constitute self-censorship. Rather, we ascribe self-censorship to A only 
when we explain the non-performance by reference to a problematic 
relationship of power or influence that leads to A’s action. 
 A first point is that in recognizing X as self-censorship we acknowledge 
the agency of the self-censor, as someone with some meaningful control over 
her or his expressive choices. As generally understood, self-censorship is a 
deliberate decision on the part of the self-censor not to express whatever is 
being self-censored: “if we are to talk of self-censorship then the will of the 
agent should have some significant non-coerced determinative role” (Horton 
2011: 98). An accusation of self-censorship (such as Orwell’s or Judt’s) is not 
characteristically a claim that someone had no choice at all but to suppress 
her views – that the level of threat or constraint was so severe that it is 
inconceivable that she speak out. Rather, the claim is that the relationships 
underlying the self-censorship make it very difficult to speak out: it requires an 
unusual level of courage or indifference to the risks and inducements attached 
to self-expression. I would like to tell my boss what I think of her but am 
constrained by fear or incentives – I censor myself in order to keep her sweet.  
To ascribe self-censorship to A also expresses a disappointed 
expectation. Where we have no expectations (e.g., of a Catholic periodical 
reproducing cartoons that mock the Pope) we do not think of self-censorship 
as a relevant concept. By contrast, the claim that publishers or broadcasters 
are being self-censoring in not reproducing the Danish or Charlie Hebdo 
cartoons does not flow from the thought that they have been persuaded to 
believe that these cartoons are so blasphemous that they should not be 
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published. Rather, the concern is that, like the obsequious and fearful subjects 
of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” they are buckling in the face of pressure, and 
hypocritically failing to act according to the standards and norms that they 
would otherwise support (Taylor 1982, Zerubavel 2006).  
Finally, I want to suggest, self-censorship is distinguished from other 
forms of expressive self-restraint through its being explained specifically by a 
power relationship (also clearly expressed in the fairy tale). To claim that X is 
an instance of self-censorship is to imply there is a critical explanation 
underpinning the agent’s behavior: although A has sufficient agency to be 
thought of as the author of her action, nevertheless power and influence is 
being exercised over her that the attribution of self-censorship identifies. This 
is compatible with a variety of conceptions of power and other underpinning 
cognate notions such as coercion, ideological domination, adaptive 
preference formation, incentives, influence, and so on. Intimidating violent 
threats of course are a pretty clear form of B’s exercising power over A – in 
the sense, that is, of threatening to make A worse off.3 So is an environment 
where the fear of those threats is present, even in the absence of the explicit 
threats themselves. The dominance of the source may be unwitting, 
distributed and opaque to the agents responsible (cf. Graham 2002: 72-5; 
Pettit 1997: 132, 142). Cliques may not know that they are cliques, even if 
they exercise considerable power over non-members. It is not a necessary 
condition of being a clique and exercising this power that members are aware 
of doing so. (Their members’ consciousness too may need to be raised.)  
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 To understand self-censorship in this way, in terms of agency, 
disappointed expectations and power, allows us to distinguish it from three 
other related forms of expressive self-restraint. In some of these cases, self-
censorship may seem like an appropriate term to apply, and in others not: 
individual intuitions are likely to differ. My point is only that there is a 
significant conceptual boundary between these different usages and self-
censorship in the political sense highlighted here. The first is tactical 
reticence, the prudential caginess about self-disclosure that characterizes 
social life. Deliberate, indeed calculated, expressive withholding is part and 
parcel of all communication, and including political communication. 
Bargaining, compromise and negotiation do not rely on artless self-disclosure 
on the part of those with interests at stake, and are not understood to do so by 
participants (Herzog 2006).  
As well as tactical reasons for withholding, there are also ethical 
reasons of tact. Consider Emma Woodhouse’s humiliation of Miss Bates in 
Jane Austen’s novel. When Emma has insulted Miss Bates (for her 
irrepressible loquacity), Mr. Knightley must speak out as he rather would not 
(“it is very far from pleasant to me, but I must, I will”) to say that here was an 
evaluative attitude she should have withheld. Now the interplay of the 
hierarchy thrown into relief by Emma’s comments and Mr. Knightley’s 
response (“Her situation being in every way below you should secure your 
compassion”), tact and self-disclosure in this situation does not seem to be 
captured by the concept of self-censorship: it is not the idea we would use to 
characterize Mr. Knightley’s reserve, or the tact he is pressing on Emma 
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(Austen 1984 (1815): 335, 339-40).4 He is offering a moral reminder, 
underpinned by a view of social order, not imposing an outlook. 
 In addition to these cases of prudential tactics and ethical tact, theorists 
of democratic deliberation also stress specifically political reasons for rules 
and constraints on political talk, grounded in considerations of mutual respect, 
recognition or reciprocity. The most well-known example of this idea is in 
Rawls’s conception of public reason. Given conditions of reasonable social 
pluralism, I cannot expect fellow citizens to act on the basis of reasons and 
arguments grounded only on my particular comprehensive conception of the 
good or moral outlook; so I cannot use those reasons and arguments to 
legitimate the use of state coercion on behalf of some particular public policy 
or law. Public deliberation consists only of the exchange of public reasons, 
that is, those reasons that do not require for their legitimation acceptance of 
some particular moral, religious or philosophical outlook. So Rawlsian public 
reason requires expressive self-restraint, in the sense that, if citizens are to 
offer proposals are to qualify as reasonable, they may have to hold back from 
offering the reasons and arguments in public that they feel truly ground their 
political proposals – to refrain, as Rawls puts it, from publicly appealing to “the 
whole truth as they see it” (Rawls 1993: 216).  
Now in each case, the examples identified may invite the claim that 
they are in fact instances of self-censorship. However, my suggestion is that 
we identify them only as instances of self-censorship in the critical sense 
when they display the core features of self-censorship outlined here: that is, 
that they are examples of expressive self-restraint, meaningfully under the 
	   11	  
control of the agent, that we would explain in terms of the various agents’ 
responses to the specific power relations in which they are enmeshed. In this 
light, the famous critique of deliberation as a “gentleman’s club” see it as self-
censoring in this sense: that is, as flowing from relationships of power that 
need to be challenged and overcome and as promoting norms of speech that 
disadvantage some participants, and compel marginalized groups to adhere 
to forms of communication that suppress their own interests, opinions and 
perspectives (Young 2000; Tully 2002; Laden 2001; Dryzek 2000). Similarly, 
we may begin to view tact as self-censorship only if we think that the motives 
for tact should be viewed as imposed forms of power, around which we 
struggle to work. When we worry about the kind of authority exercised by Mr. 
Knightley over Emma, in other words, it becomes relevant to think of norms of 
tact and civility as forms of self-censorship. Finally, in the case of bargaining 
and negotiation, where there is an inbuilt tactical reason to withhold beliefs 
and evaluative attitudes, there is still scope to define a distinct realm of self-
censorship, in the terms outlined here. This arises where we would explain 
the motives for self-restraint not – or not only – with reference to a person’s 
view of her own tactical advantage but by reference to a problematic power 
relationship which leads her to not to express what we normally would expect.  
 Contested intuitions about whether X is an instance of self-censorship 
can be explained, then, not only through there being different interpretations 
of the empirical features of X but also by virtue of the concept’s resting on 
three concepts each of which plainly invites challenge and conflicting 
theoretical interpretation, namely, agency, the normative expectations we 
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have of individuals and institutions, and power. Before turning to the 
significance of this for democratic theory, we can now highlight the significant 
differences between this conceptual map of self-censorship sketched here 
and that produced by Cook and Heilman in their important analysis. At the 
centre of their account is a descriptive distinction between public and private 
self-censorship. Public self-censorship is the accommodation on the part of an 
agent (“individual or corporation”) to an external censor (“a public agent, such 
as a government or public authority”). Private self-censorship is a type of self-
censorship “where the censor and censee are the same agent, and this agent 
acts as censor over itself in the absence of an externally existing public 
censor”. So, for instance, someone who keeps her dislike of a colleague to 
herself out of a sense of what constitutes appropriate behaviour at the 
workplace is a private self-censor: if this is a matter of abiding by a social 
norm this is held to be private self-censorship by proxy; if it is grounded in “a 
personal sense of decency”, this is private self-censorship by self-constraint 
(Cook and Heilman 2013: 186-7). Now this descriptive distinction is thought to 
deliver a normative payoff. Principles of free speech only apply when there 
are coercive relations between agents, and so are only thought to apply where 
there is public self-censorship. Since private self-censorship only involves an 
intrapersonal relationship, coercion and principles of free speech are 
inapplicable, although Cook and Heilman (2013: 191) “leave open the 
possibility that these types of intrapersonal conflict may require a normative 
principle of some other kind to regulate the interests of competing 
considerations”. 
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Now the distinction between public and private that Cook and Heilman 
draw here is rather slippery. An initial point, as I have suggested, is that there 
is a more complex conceptual landscape of expressive self-restraint and 
civility than the category of private self-censorship seems to allow. It seems 
reductive to present refraining to speak ill of a colleague on the grounds of 
decency as a form of self-censorship or even self-restraint: at least, we would 
want a richer story to make this seem like the right concept to apply. More 
germane to the political case, public self-censorship on Cook and Heilman’s 
model is expressive self-restraint by an agent in response to a public authority 
as a censor. In terms of the analysis offered here, it makes sense to think of a 
public censor in this sense as one source of power that can explain self-
censorship. From this perspective, the paradigmatic case of self-censorship is 
the pre-emption of actual censorship by arbitrary state power, to avoid the 
punishment stemming from falling foul of the public authority (e.g., Patterson 
1984). However, it is not clear what constitutes a censoring public authority, 
for this model. One ambiguity is that it is not clear whether this only 
encompasses law that restricts self-expression and which empowers public 
authorities to restrict expression, or also law that allows for self-expression to 
be restricted in other ways (for example, rules of debate, libel laws, privacy 
laws, or an absence of legal protection for whistleblowers). To the extent that 
we may think of rules of debate, for example, as involving legitimate 
curtailments of untrammelled freedom of expression, we would not view 
compliance with them as self-censorship. Rather, abiding by these rules is 
constitutive of participation in debate, and the kind of self-restraint they may 
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demand does not flow from the exercise of power and involve the 
disappointed expectations that characterize self-censorship. (Of course, to the 
extent that it does carry with it these involvements, self-censorship may be an 
applicable category, as we have seen in the case of skeptics about 
democratic deliberation.) 
Public censorship alone is meant to raise the possibility of coercion, as 
private self-censorship cannot do so, since an agent coerce herself, on this 
view. What constitutes a “public” censor, then, seems to be any agency that 
may have this coercive effect: in their own analysis of the Danish cartoons 
controversy a public authority includes not only legally constituted censors, 
such as Danish law, but “those parts of the Muslim community that have 
threatened (and/or carried out) violence, legal action and public pressure” 
(Cook and Heilman 2013: 185). Cook and Heilman require this source of 
pressure to count as public: otherwise, those publishers who self-censored in 
response to this are not thought to do so in a way that raises an issue for 
freedom of speech but only “privately” and in a way that raises a different and 
unspecified set of normative concerns. It is not clear what defines a source of 
self-censorship as public beyond its having potentially coercive effects. But if 
that is the case, then the independent descriptive value of the distinction 
between private and public here is difficult to see. What matters for defining X 
as an instance of self-censorship is not whether we view the source of self-
censorship as “public” or “private” but whether it involves an exercise of 
power.  
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III. Sources and Effects 
In the light of this analysis, we can see that one important critical approach to 
self-censorship focuses on the sources of self-censorship, particularly on the 
power relations steering the motivations of the self-censor. A focus on the 
source of self-censorship has characterised the “neo-Roman” republican 
focus on it as a symptom of unfreedom. From this republican perspective, 
unfreedom consists not in the presence of a constraint on an agent but in the 
dependence of an agent on the arbitrary will of a “master”. The republican 
anxieties articulated by Philip Pettit (2006: 137) famously zero in on the 
insecurity of subjection to arbitrary domination: 
The problem with the subjects of a kindly master is that while arbitrary 
interference in their lives may actually be unlikely, it will not be unlikely 
in virtue of their social standing, only in virtue of the contingent fact of 
the master’s goodwill or indifference or inattention. This means that if 
people have to rely consciously on such contingent facts they will be 
constrained, at whatever cost in dignity, to keep their masters sweet by 
practicing self-censorship and self-ingratiation; in the absence of a 
suitable social standing, groveling of this kind will be their only 
protection. 
For this republican perspective, subjection to arbitrary power is constitutive of 
unfreedom, considered as dependence “on the dispositions – however benign 
or gentle – of our princes” while self-censorship is a symptom of this condition 
(Laborde and Maynor 2008: 7). Quentin Skinner (2008: 93-4) stresses the 
way that dependence, even without overt interference, nevertheless interferes 
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in agents’ actions, through the self-censorship they engage in once they know 
themselves to be dependent: exponents of republican liberty “agree that 
anyone who reflects on their own servitude will probably come to feel unfree 
to act or forebear from acting in certain ways. But what actually makes them 
unfree is the mere fact of their living in subjection to arbitrary power”. The 
wish to keep the dominating party sweet is sufficient to explain self-censoring 
behaviour. The key source of self-censorship is not more or less explicit 
threats of harm or specific interferences (although these may continue to have 
their place) but the absence of protections against the master’s will.  
Where the exemplary source of self-censorship in neo-Roman 
republicanism is the slaveowner wielding arbitrary power, for the tradition of 
anxiety about self-censorship that comes down from Tocqueville, the source 
of self-censorship is the stifling force of the majority, which is unleashed by 
the egalitarianism of modern democratic societies.5 For this version of the 
worry about self-censorship, it has its source in the potential despotism of the 
majority. To return to Judt’s invocation of Tocqueville, while communication 
can of course be used instrumentally to deceive, instill false beliefs, and 
marginalize dissident points of view, the accusation here is significantly 
different. In this case, what is thought to constrain the expression of non-
standard opinions (truths, in Judt’s view) is not deception but the stifling force 
of “common sense”. The concern of this tradition is with the climate of opinion 
that allows for free discussion, not merely with those moments when state 
power is invoked. While not formally constraining the individual, a conformist 
public opinion makes the expression of dissenting views unbearably risky. 
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Thought is an invisible power and one almost impossible to lay hands 
on, which makes sport of all tyrannies. In our day the most absolute 
sovereigns in Europe cannot prevent certain thoughts hostile to their 
power from silently circulating in their states and even in their own 
courts. It is not like that in America; while the majority is in doubt, one 
talks; but when it has irrevocably pronounced, everyone is silent, and 
friends and enemies alike seem to make for its bandwagon. 
(Tocqueville 1969: 254)  
This works through the fear of ostracism and humiliation: 
The master no longer says: “Think like me or you die”. He does say: 
“You are free not to think as I do; you can keep your life and property 
and all; but from this day you are a stranger among us. You can keep 
your privileges in the township, but they will be useless to you, for if you 
solicit your fellow citizens’ votes, they will not give them to you, and if 
you only ask for their esteem, they will make excuses for refusing that. 
You will remain among men but you will lose your rights to count as 
one. When you approach your fellows, they will shun you as an impure 
being, and even those who believe in your innocence will abandon you 
too, lest they in turn be shunned. Go in peace, I have given you your 
life, but it is a life worse than death. (Tocqueville 1969: 255-6) 
In democracies, the courtier spirit identified by the republicans is not 
eliminated but democratized, and put in reach of greater numbers, and “the 
master” is relocated in public opinion. These republican and liberal accounts 
are not of course the only diagnoses of the sources of self-censorship. 
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However, drawing attention to them serves to highlight the significance of self-
censorship for political theory: self-censorship in each case is viewed as a 
symptom of an underlying power relation that the theory identifies and 
dissects. 
The other side of the democratic rejection of self-censorship focuses 
on its political effects for key democratic values. Three in particular stand out: 
self-censorship diminishes accountability by stifling the sincerity on which this 
relies, it erodes autonomy, and it dilutes the epistemic quality of democratic 
debate. On the first count, self-censorship seems to undermine accountability 
and trustworthiness. According to what Elizabeth Markovits (2006) calls the 
sincerity ethic for political deliberation, democratic deliberation requires 
sincere self-disclosure. From a Habermasian perspective on deliberation, the 
claim to sincere self-disclosure is an underlying presupposition of 
communicative action and discourse ethics, taken as a normative backdrop to 
democratic deliberation. Regardless of whether it is explicitly at issue – 
“thematized”, in Habermas’s term – the participant’s sincerity is implicitly 
claimed in the act of communicative participation (Habermas 1990: 136; 
Habermas 1996: 318-9). The failure of sincere self-disclosure expressed in 
self-censorship undermines the conditions of democracy. If we do not 
sincerely express our points of view and reasons for policies – if our 
expressed views aren’t genuinely ours – then we cannot be held to account 
for them, in the same way as we could if these reasons were genuinely ours. 
Further, as Jack Knight and James Johnson (2011: 139) suggest, an 
awareness of this can fuel various sorts of reaction formation which add to the 
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pollution of public discourse, from the cynical dismissal of all public discourse 
as inevitably corrupted to a kind of arrogant nonconformity, “breeding 
detachment, reinforcing contempt, and inflating self-importance” (cf. Loury 
1994). 
Second, self-censorship erodes autonomy:  the “tyranny of prevailing 
feeling and opinion”, in Mill’s (1991 (1859): 9; see Urbinati 2007) famous 
formulation, penetrates “deeply into the details of life … enslaving the soul 
itself”. The practice of self-censorship is not only a symptom of an underlying 
power relationship but is thought to be problematic in that it distorts our 
characters. Self-censorship may be accompanied by the “sour grapes” form of 
adaptive preference formation as the servile come to identify their own beliefs 
and interests with those of the master or majority (Elster 1983).  For the 
tradition of political thinking that comes down from Tocqueville this 
conformism is a likely and terrifying possibility. Beyond this, however, we may 
worry that the disposition to self-censor can outrun any immediate occasion 
and become a settled feature of an individual’s character.6  
The third damaging effect on democratic values is the impact of self-
censorship on the epistemic and deliberative quality of democratic debate. 
From this perspective, democratic debate is enriched by a diversity of 
opinions and challenges (Anderson 2006; Landemore 2012). It is 
impoverished when points of view are ruled out not as a result of reasoned 
argument but as the effect of conformist responses to power relations. 
Arguments cannot be properly understood and assessed, and truth cannot be 
spoken to power, in these circumstances. The epistemic damage that flows 
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from what Mill (1991 (1859): 21; cf. White 2012) calls “the peculiar evil of 
silencing the expression of an opinion” flows just as much from self-silencing, 
reducing the diversity of voices and opinions that improves the epistemic 
quality of discussion and decision. 
In sum, then, we can see self-censorship as raising for the democratic 
moral sensibility a range of concerns, not only as a symptom of unfreedom 
but also as a corrosive of the wider set of social conditions that are thought to 
be important constitutive elements of democracy. The political conception of 
self-censorship outlined seems to squeeze out room for any form of self-
censorship that is compatible with democracy. From a democratic 
perspective, then, although we tolerate and sometimes require other forms of 
self-restraint (such as the discursive norms proposed by the deliberative 
democrat, perhaps), self-censorship, in the specific political sense delineated 
here, seems by contrast intolerable, flowing from objectionable power 
relations and corroding important democratic values. 
  
IV. Self-Censorship for Democrats 
In this section, I want to argue that this skepticism about self-censorship 
should not have the last word, as it is a more ambivalent phenomenon than 
these criticisms suggest: the democratic values which condemn self-
censorship can also support it. Let us explore this claim with respect to the 
sources and effects of self-censorship. 
The challenge that this view of self-censorship gives rise to is to find a 
way of both acknowledging the agency of the self-censor and viewing that 
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agency as significantly impaired by relations of power and influence. 
According to the account of self-censorship outlined, this agency is impaired 
through the stacking of incentives or threats such that we should view the self-
censoring agent as subject to a power relationship which means she does not 
act as she would in the absence of this relationship. To the extent that we 
view the self-censor as lacking agency, as merely being guided by duress or 
incentives, then self-censorship seems intolerable by democratic lights, for the 
reasons outlined in the previous section. Yet, as we have seen, the self-
censoring agent is not viewed as entirely lacking agency. Identifying self-
censorship involves ascribing to the self-censor enough agency over her 
action to distinguish it from merely constrained or compelled action. If we lay 
stress on the agency of the self-censor, then self-censorship seems tolerable 
as a form of free speech. The democratic concern with agency and autonomy 
that leads the critic of self-censorship to condemn it also provides a reason to 
accept it. Since self-censoring agents are viewed as expressive agents, as 
outlined in section II, the reasons we have for respecting free speech 
generally apply in this case. Just as we tolerate other acts of free expression 
of whose content we disapprove, we should tolerate self-censorship (cf. 
Horton 2011: 101; Sedler 2012). 
Understood in this way, we may regard an act of self-censorship as 
contemptible in the sense that we find the specific content of what is 
articulated contemptible (dishonest, for example) but no more so than other 
contemptible uses of free speech. Indeed, Orwellian venom seems to 
presuppose the responsibility and blameworthiness of those at whom it is 
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directed. The more we ascribe responsibility for self-censorship to the agent, 
the more it is tolerable, as an exercise of free speech. Conversely, the less we 
view the agent herself as responsible and the more we ascribe responsibility 
to the background power relationships, other agents, etc., the less applicable 
the concept of self-censorship, as a choice on the part of an agent, seems to 
be. 
We can also see this ambivalence when we consider the effects of self-
censorship. The democratic response to the democratic critique of self-
censorship here starts from the idea that restrictions on speech may be in 
some cases be instrumental in removing obstacles to expression or (an 
important theme in the recent literature) obstacles to reception of speech.7 In 
real discursive conditions free speech can be a medium for bullying, public 
contempt, insinuation, and humiliation. The experience of this threatens the 
autonomy and capacity for participation of those on the receiving end of this 
speech, especially if they are relatively powerless and lack the discursive and 
other resources to respond, and can pollute the quality of democratic 
discussion. The idea that some citizens are excluded from effective 
participation by stereotypes, cultural norms, and lack of discursive and 
material resources is a familiar one. So is the idea that untrammeled free 
speech on the part of a powerful group can serve as a medium to enforce this 
exclusion.   
Self-censorship can play a role in countering this: the racist member of 
a dominant group who keeps his opinions to himself out of fear of the social 
and professional consequences that flow from unabashed self-expression 
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helps to maintain an atmosphere in which all can participate freely and 
equally. We can note this while accepting that this is an instance of self-
censorship, in the specific sense outlined in section II. However, the claim 
here is that this is tolerable when it promotes parity of participation, in 
circumstances when no other means of countering discursive inequalities is at 
hand. It is better that informal censorship plays a role than that nothing does – 
better, that is, for ensuring the equal participation of those who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged by a public sphere with a more relaxed attitude 
toward racist self-expression. 
From this perspective, self-censorship is an “ordinary vice” of 
democratic societies, which can serve to protect, as well as diminish, the 
quality of democratic participation and decision-making. The depth of 
disagreement in beliefs and interests, together with mutual wariness in 
democratic societies, means that these societies “cannot afford public 
sincerity”, as Judith Shklar (1984: 78) puts it in her well-known discussion of 
hypocrisy:   
Honesties that humiliate and a stiff-necked refusal to compromise 
would ruin democratic civility in a political society in which people have 
many serious differences of belief and interest. Our sense of public 
ends is so wavering and elusive because we do not even see the same 
social scene before us. We do not agree on the facts or figures of 
social life, and we heartily dislike one another’s religious, sexual, 
intellectual and political commitments – not to mention one another’s 
ethnic, racial and class character.8 
	   24	  
The “democracy of everyday life … does not arise from sincerity. It is based 
on the pretense that we must speak to each other as if social standings were 
a matter of indifference in our views of one another” (Shklar 1984: 77). A form 
of public life without self-censorship of this sort would not be one that allows 
for more honesty or truthfulness but one that opens up a more unfettered 
expression of mutual loathing, or of the loathing of the strong for the weak. 
This claim about the potential of self-censorship is fairly minimal. It 
does not require us to believe that self-censorship always has beneficial 
effects or even that other modes of regulating expression may not be superior, 
where they are available. It should be distinguished from two more 
problematic ways of addressing the democratic critique, which can usefully be 
discussed in a bit more detail. The first dissolves the worry about the effects 
of self-censorship by supporting what could be called the no-sincerity in 
politics thesis. Let us consider again the claim that public discussion should 
be governed by a norm of sincerity which self-censorship undermines. On the 
face of it, this claim about sincerity seems too strong, however, and difficult to 
reconcile with the acknowledgement that trusting in others’ sincerity, like other 
forms of trust, is inherently difficult even in democratic political arenas (cf. 
Warren 1999; Festenstein 2009). A therapeutic response is to dissolve the 
worry about self-censorship by the rejecting the very idea that sincerity, 
truthfulness and cognate concerns have a place in democratic 
communication. A concern about self-censorship is a concern that a speaker 
is not truly saying what is on her mind or expressing her genuinely held 
evaluative attitude. Perhaps, however, this is too much to demand. We may 
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view politics as a realm of rhetoric, opinion, and appearance, where what 
matters is the publicly expressed face and views of the speaker, not what we 
imagine her genuine beliefs and attitudes are. On a very ludic interpretation, 
worrying about self-censorship in politics is to make a category mistake like 
worrying about sincerity of poker players. Political speech is a realm of 
rhetorical speech, play and dissimulation. The claim to be removing the mask 
and speaking the whole truth, or from the heart, is itself only another move in 
the game. As Martin Jay suggests in his interesting resuscitation of this line of 
argument, this is parabasis (Jay 1999, 2010). Near the end of a classical 
Greek comedy, the chorus, unmasked, steps forward to address the audience 
directly in a speech that contains the author’s views on some topical matter. 
Of course this too is part of the play. From this perspective, the sincerity ethic 
for political deliberation sets a standard of access to beliefs and attitudes 
which is impossible to meet but also, thankfully, irrelevant to political 
deliberation. 
 The standard is impossible to meet since sincerity, in Hannah Arendt’s 
words, is “truly unknowable … A fellow citizen’s soul remains opaque and 
unreadable to us; part of the beauty of democracy is that, unlike the 
totalitarian state, democracy gives us the freedom to have a private life” 
(Markovits 2006: 267; Arendt 1977: 96-8). As this way of putting the point 
suggests, this unknowability claim has an epistemic and a normative strand. 
The epistemic strand of the claim is to the effect that identifying authentic 
motivations and beliefs through speech is a futile task; they remain hidden to 
the agent as well as to those who try to interpret her actions. The “human 
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heart” of political agents, is “a place of darkness which, with certainty, no 
human eye can penetrate” (Arendt 1977: 96). The normative strand is the 
claim that all that matters is the public person, and that attempting to dig 
deeper in order to unearth others’ real views and attitudes is a violation of the 
scope for privacy that democracy allows. The standard is irrelevant, because 
what matters is only the factual truth or normative appropriateness of public 
speech, not the sincerity of the speakers: if someone lies, then we focus on 
the content of the lie, the consistency with previous utterances, and so on, but 
not on whether or not what she has said expresses what she truly believes. 
And this focus provides enough for democratic politics. In particular, it 
provides an adequate basis for accountability and trustworthiness.  
Now this is a complex and challenging set of claims. There is no space 
fully to address them, but on the face of it there seems to be a lot in the 
thought that the inner views and attitudes of political actors may indeed be 
irrelevant to how we evaluate their actions and speech, and that they are also 
in many cases inaccessible, including to the agents themselves (cf. Dunn 
2000). However, this epistemic skepticism may not in itself eliminate our 
interest in sincerity. There seems to be a genuine residual issue, for example, 
of whether a politician is attempting to censor her own racism which is 
nevertheless “leaking” into the public realm, whether she is subtly projecting a 
coded appeal to racist voters, whether this is a matter of over-interpretation, 
and so on. Further, and more importantly here, epistemic skepticism about 
sincerity does not dissolve the democratic worries about self-censorship. 
Rejecting the idea that the conditions of democracy must include the publicly 
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accessible sincerity of participants does not address the concerns about 
power and its effects that are core to the democratic anxiety about self-
censorship. This anxiety does not spring from the thought that self-censorship 
perverts the expression of A’s sincerely held points of view but only that it 
blocks A’s point of view that otherwise would have been expressed in the 
absence of the relationship with B. This point of view itself may be held quite 
insincerely. A may gleefully spread a rumor about a colleague, which he does 
not sincerely believe at all, among co-workers – but be intimidated from 
gossiping in this way in front of someone on whom he wants to make a good 
impression. Similarly, a political candidate may offer one view of the 
relationship between wealth creation, entrepreneurship and taxes to a closed 
audience of wealthy donors, and another on national television – but we do 
not need to assume that the first audience is necessarily receiving this 
candidate’s sincere opinions to view her as self-censoring in the latter case, 
only that her relationship to the wider audience in the second case is an 
important part of the explanation of the difference between her utterances in 
these two contexts. 
The other position which needs to be distinguished from the minimal 
case made here is argument ingeniously developed by Jon Elster (1986, 
1997) and others on behalf of the so-called civilizing force of hypocrisy in 
democratic deliberation (cf. Sunstein 1993; Dryzek 2000; Williams 2000). This 
takes self-censorship to be a necessary part of a normatively reliable 
mechanism for delivering one important goal for deliberative democrats, 
namely, impartial consensus. While an honestly expressed motive for a 
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proposal may be “this is good for my group”, the requirement to set out 
arguments for policies in the public forum compels speakers to frame their 
proposals in such a way as to appeal to the interests of all. As Elster (1986: 
111) puts it, “publicity does not eliminate base motives, but forces or induces 
speakers to hide them”. In particular, “[t]he presence of a public makes it 
especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest. Even if one’s 
fellow assembly members would not be shocked, the audience would be. In 
general, this civilizing force of hypocrisy is a desirable effect of publicity”. Now 
this is a mechanism of self-censorship, in the sense we have set out here: the 
power of the majority “forces or induces” me to frame my utterances in terms 
that won’t trigger their rejection or expose me to shame or ridicule. Over time, 
it is argued, this strategic adoption of impartial principles for political action 
becomes a genuinely held commitment, through a psychological mechanism 
of “dissonance reduction”, according to which it is difficult for me to live with a 
set of public justifications that diverge from my real motives. So, while the 
sources of this self-censorship and its consequences lie in compulsion or 
inducement, the workings of this mechanism result in the sincere adoption of 
an outlook that enhances the quality of democratic debate.  
Both the stability and normative attractiveness of the purported 
mechanism outlined by this line of thought are problematic. First, the 
adaptation of preferences forced or induced by this process may only be 
superficial, lasting only as long as the perceived sanctions of stepping out of 
line are thought to apply (Johnson 1997; Knight and Johnson 2011: 136-144). 
When these conditions change, what appeared to be a thorough identification 
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with social interests may quickly alter. As Uriah Heep puts it, once he has 
risen in the world, “I am very umble to the present moment, Master 
Copperfield, but I’ve got a little power” (Dickens cited Shklar 1984: 56). With a 
little power, the mask of humility drops, and the loyalty that seemed 
constitutive of his identity (at least to the gullible, and perhaps to Uriah Heep 
himself, if not to David and the reader) evaporates as pertinent social norms 
cease to exercise any sanctioning force. Second, identification with impartial 
standards that is constructed in this way seems to be undermined by the 
conditions of its own production. If these standards are arrived at through 
force and inducement, then this is how they may appear to those who end up 
adhering to them. The claims made on behalf of this mechanism assume that 
hypocrisy in this guise has civilizing effects, when it may breed 
disillusionment, cynicism or contempt about the language of public discourse. 
To the extent that thinking in terms of a wider interest is viewed as forced on 
us, we may reduce dissonance by growing more cynical about the general 
interest, rather than internalizing it. The general interest will seem only to be 
the expression of the power of the majority.  
In addition to being unstable, this mechanism seems normatively 
dubious. The compulsion underlying the transformation of preferences is at 
odds with the commitment to the autonomy of the agents involved. The 
workings of this mechanism rests on psychological processes that are 
themselves shielded from critical scrutiny, occurring behind the backs of the 
agents affected, as it were. This undermines the autonomy of preference 
formation, and recalls the democratic worries about conformism.9 The form of 
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impartiality delivered is not valuable from the perspective of this conception of 
democracy. It is, then, overreaching to think of self-censorship as a necessary 
part of a normatively reliable instrument for delivering a deliberatively valuable 
impartiality. 
Unlike the civilizing force of hypocrisy thesis, the minimal claim I am 
making on behalf of self-censorship addresses only “speech” or publication. 
There is no assumption that there is a benign feedback mechanism that goes 
to work on the underlying attitudes of participants. Nevertheless we may think 
that the minimal claim falls foul of the objection to the mechanism underlying 
the civilizing force of hypocrisy argument. First, it is natural for a supporter of 
a “talk-centric” conception of democracy to hold that the “only remedy for false 
or invalid arguments is criticism […] The only cure for false, manipulative or 
inappropriate talk is more talk that exposes or corrects it, whether as a string 
of reasons, a mode of recognition, a way of making points, or a narrative” 
(Young 2000: 79). Accepting the instrumental value of self-censorship closes 
off the possibility of publicly ventilating and correcting invalid and destructive 
views. A second response points to the malign side-effects of tolerating self-
censorship. In such an environment, politics can then become a matter of (not 
always subtle) signaling and “dog whistles”, allowing participants to shelter 
behind ambiguity and the familiar claim about the construction aggrieved 
parties are putting on legitimate expressions of opinion. Awareness of self-
censorship may lead to a self-righteous refusal to respect public standards 
and a desire to probe the limits of tolerance (Knight and Johnson 2011: 140). 
However these responses are subject to the same difficulty that afflicts the 
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civilizing force of hypocrisy argument, namely, they help themselves to 
particular mechanistic assumptions that may not manifest themselves in 
practice. It is not necessarily the case that the only remedy for bad talk is 
more talk of higher quality, even if the latter is available. And while self-
censorship may provoke cynicism or self-righteousness it may not, any more 
than it automatically guides an agent to a more socially minded point of view. 
 
V. 
The goal of this article has been to set out a concept of self-censorship that 
captures the specific political concerns of those who use it, and to articulate 
the concerns and issues that it raises for democratic theory. These, I have 
argued, are less clear-cut than the democratic criticisms of the sources and 
effects of self-censorship suggest. Our relation to self-censorship is (or should 
be) ambivalent, since the democratic values that underpin the criticism of self-
censorship also suggest reasons it should be tolerated in some 
circumstances.  
This is a qualified claim. This article does not offer an endorsement of 
self-censorship, or an injunction to it, and is not intended to license bullying by 
gentlemen’s (or anyone else’s) clubs, or to promote a cowed and secretive 
media. Nor does this remove the taint from self-censorship: its sources in 
power and influence mean precisely that we tolerate rather than endorse or 
vindicate it. Rather, the point is that we need to be able to distinguish tolerable 
and intolerable forms of self-censorship, while recalling that an action’s being 
self-censorship does not in itself establish its intolerability. The grounds for 
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this tolerance, to be identified token by token, are that it can help to sustain 
the same democratic values that critics invoke for rejecting it as a type. 
Equally, identifying an instance of self-censorship is not in itself an evaluative 
conversation-stopper: its critics cannot help themselves to the assumption 
that it must play this role – itself sometimes a useful rhetorical blanket over 
careful scrutiny of the sources and effects of speech – but need to make good 
on their assessments in each case.  
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1 This article’s origins lie in a talk given at a conference on self-censorship 
organized by Jonathan Parkin at the University of York in 2007, under the 
auspices of the Morrell Trust. I am particularly grateful to Dr Parkin, and, for 
comments at the time and in the many years since, to Phil Cook, Alan 
Haworth, John Horton, Sue Mendus, Mihaela Mihai, and Tim Stanton. This 
journal’s referees were also immensely helpful. 
2 George Orwell, cited (in the context of contemporary political theorists’ 
anxieties about self-censorship) in Wingo 2003: 103. See Foerstel (1998) for 
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3 On incentives as power, see Grant (2012). 
4 On this theme, see also Kingwell 1995; Davidson 2004. Different examples 
of ethical tact are discussed under the heading “self-censorship good” in 
Sedler (2012). These include, for instance, a newspaper’s self-imposed 
judgement not to publish the name of a victim. This kind of case falls outside 
of the scope of self-censorship in the sense identified here. 
5 From the vast secondary literature, particularly relevant is Allen 1991; Robin 
2004; Elster 2009; Marczewski 2010.  
6 This article is not focused on institutional responses to the fear of 
conformism, but it is worth noting that such different critics of self-censorship 
as the imposition of majority values as John Stuart Mill (1991 (1861)) and Iris 
Marion Young (1990, 2000; cf. Phillips 1995) converge on mechanisms of 
group representation in order to provide a protected sphere for vulnerable 
discursive agents – although they have different views of who those agents 
are and the conception of vulnerability that triggers group representation. 
7 See, for example, Newey 2007; Langton 2009; Waldron 2012; Maitra and 
McGowan 2012.  
8 For a development of Shklar’s treatment of hypocrisy, see Runciman 2008; 
Jay 2010.  
9 This is probably not a problem for Sunstein, for whom it can serve another 
item in the arsenal of libertarian paternalism: Sunstein and Thaler 2008. On 
the relationship of autonomy and Elster’s conception of adaptive preferences, 
see Colburn 2011. 
